Collective intentionality and the constitution view; An essay on acting together by bij de Weg, Henk
1 
 
© Henk bij de Weg 2021. Free to quote, provided the source is acknowledged. 
 
 
Collective intentionality and the constitution view. An essay on 
acting together 
 





One of the currently most discussed themes in the philosophy of action is whether there is 
some kind of collective intention that explains what groups do independent of what the indi-
viduals who make up the group intend and do. One of the main obstacles to solve this prob-
lem is that on the one hand collective intentionality is no simple summation, aggregate, or dis-
tributive pattern of individual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim), while on the other hand 
collective intentionality is in the heads of the participating individuals, so to speak, and so it is 
owned by each of the separate individuals who make up the group (the Individual Ownership 
Claim). The claims are contradictory and until now no satisfactory solution how to reconcile 
them has been found. In this article I argue that the constitution view, like the one developed 
by Lynne R. Baker, can provide a way to sidestep the contradiction. Just as a statue as such is 
constituted by the marble it is made of but has characteristics that are different from the mar-
ble (a statue has a head and legs, while the marble hasn’t; while the marble is stony and the 
statue as such isn’t), I argue that a group is constituted by its members and that a group on the 
one hand and its members on the other hand have different characteristics. This is possible be-
cause group and members are on different levels. Then there is no longer a contradiction be-
tween the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Claim, for the former claim con-
cerns the group level and the latter claim concerns the level of the group members. This ex-
plains that a group can have intentions that are no simple summation, aggregate, or distribu-
tive patterns of the intentions of its members and that group intentions can be different from if 
not contradictory to what the individual members taken together intend. 
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One of the currently most discussed themes in the philosophy of action is whether there is 
some kind of group intention, collective intention, shared intention or how you would call it, 
and, if there is, how to explain such a common intention. If an individual plans an action like 
going to run this afternoon, we say that she intends to do so or has such an intention. But what 
if several persons plan to do something together like playing tennis or performing Verdi’s 
opera Rigoletto? Since you cannot do this alone, can we say then that there is a kind of com-
mon intention and, if so, what is it then? Several answers to this question have been proposed. 




In what follows, I’ll use the label “collective intentionality” for referring to the phenomenon 
of common intentionality, in line with the practice that has come into use since Searle intro-
duced it in his 1990 paper “Collective Intentions and Actions”. Actually, the label is a bit con-
fusing, since it can refer both to the phenomenon of common intentionality in general and to 
Searle’s version. In this essay I’ll use “collective intentionality” in the general sense, unless I 
explicitly refer to Searle’s interpretation of the concept.  
In section 1 of this essay, I present the main views on collective intentionality and I show that 
they don’t reconcile the two contradictory claims that are at the heart of the debate on collec-
tive intentionality: The Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Claim. In section 2, 
I introduce the constitution view developed by Lynne R. Baker as a way to sidestep the con-
tradiction between the two claims. In section 3, I argue that groups are entities of their own 
independent of the individuals who make up these groups. In section 4, I explain with the help 
of Baker’s constitution view how this is possible and how groups are constituted by their 
members and how the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Claim can be recon-
ciled. In section 5 I discuss how the views on collective intentionality developed by Bratman, 
Gilbert, Searle and Tuomela fit into my approach. In section 6 I add yet some concluding re-
marks. 
 
1. The main views on collective intentionality 
1.1 In Bratman’s approach to collective intentionality, a typical case is that several individuals 
have agreed to do a task or another activity together and each individual has the intention to 
do his part to reach the shared goal and knows that the others will do their parts as well. 
Moreover the individual action plans mesh. Then we can say that these individuals have a 
shared intention, so Bratman. This must be contrasted with the situation that each of these in-
dividuals performs a task without consulting the others and without appointing together how 
to coordinate their actions. Even if they happen to do the same thing, then they don’t share an 
intention, but they have the same intention at most. So we can say – my interpretation – that 
in Bratman’s view a shared intention is a conglomeration of coordinated individual intentions. 
(Bratman, 1999; 2014; see for more details my 2016). 
Gilbert argues that we need something more than a shared goal, pursued by co-ordinated indi-
vidual actions, when we want to explain a group activity. According to her, if two or more in-
dividuals plan to do a task or another activity together, and act accordingly, they participate 
“in an activity of a special kind, one whose goal is the goal of a plural subject, as opposed to 
the shared personal goal of the participants.” Acting together “involves an ‘our goal’ as op-
posed to two or more ‘my goals’.” (Gilbert, 1996, p. 187; italics mine). The agents concerned 
have a joint commitment, so an obligation to contribute honestly to the activity they have (im-
plicitly or explicitly) agreed upon to perform. Each individual can cancel the obligation to 
contribute to the common task only with the consent of all other participants. (Gilbert 1996; 
2014; again see for more details my 2016). 
According to Searle, collective intention – so what for Bratman was “shared intention” and for 
Gilbert “joint commitment” – transcends the individual minds. “[C]ollective intentions ex-
pressed in the form ‘we intend to do such-and-such’, and, ‘we are doing such-and-such’ are 
… primitive phenomena and cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentions …” Ap-
proaches like those by Bratman and Gilbert, so Searle, or the one by Tuomela (see below) 
have an important defect: For them collective intention and with it group action is a kind of 
summation of individual intentions or behaviour. In Searle’s view, group intention, and with it 
group action, is a phenomenon of its own, although it is performed by the actions of individ-
ual agents. The existence of the group is present in the individual contributions to a collective 
intention that is not present in the individual action as such, although the individual action 
does contribute to it. Group intentions are ideas that exist in the minds of the individual 
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agents, but they are performed by means of what the agents individually do. (Searle 1990; my 
2016) 
Tuomela then, to complete this master quartet, contends that agents can have different types 
of intention. In the case of individuals working together, what is important is what he calls 
we-intentions. Tuomela’s approach is quite technical and difficult to characterize in a few 
words, but for this article it is enough to say that a we-intention is a kind of mental state or 
“mode” an agent has when co-operating with others or intending to do so. When acting alone 
an individual agent is in an I-mode (mental state), but when deciding for some reason or an-
other to pursue a common goal together with others, agents switch to the we-mode and they 
have then a kind of we-intention or joint intention to perform the planned joint action to-
gether. (Tuomela 2007) 
 
1.2 So far my summary of the four major approaches to collective intentionality. There are 
more such approaches and, like the four just discussed, they are all different in relevant re-
spects. Nevertheless, they all start, implicitly or explicitly from two claims. These are, follow-
ing Schweikard and Schmid (2020): 
 
- Collective intentionality is no simple summation, aggregate, or distributive pattern of indi-
vidual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim). 
- Collective intentionality is had by the participating individuals, and all the intentionality an 
individual has is their own (the Individual Ownership Claim). 
 
This is what most approaches to collective intentionality have in common and what they use 
as often implicit starting points for their discussions. However, as can be seen in the four ap-
proaches just mentioned, the answers to the question what the collectiveness of collective in-
tentionality involves can be very different, despite these shared starting points. Again follow-
ing Schweikard and Schmid (2020), some, like Bratman, see the collectiveness in the content 
of the intention: individual agents strive to do the same together. Others see the collectiveness 
in the mode of the intention: In Tuomela’s approach the agent switches from an individual ac-
tion mode to a we-mode, when planning to perform an action together with other agents. 
Again others see the collectiveness in the acting subject, like Gilbert does: for her a group is a 
plural subject with its own collective intentional state called joint commitment. Searle’s ap-
proach is a kind of mix between the mode-approach and the subject-approach: we-intentions 
are not individual intentions put together (mode-switch), but together with the mode-switch 
also the bearer (=subject) of the intention switches from the individual to the group. 
 
1.3 A quite different approach is the one proposed by Deborah Perron Tollefsen: Ascribing 
collective intentionality is a stance in Dennett’s sense and one doesn’t need to suppose an in-
tentional acting subject. It’s a way we interpret what happens, and so this approach is called 
interpretivism. 
According to Tollefsen (2015) we don’t ascribe intentions to the brain, even though the think-
ing process takes place there. No, we ascribe intentions to the whole person, and that’s what 
we do when we try to interpret, understand or explain the actions and/or behaviour performed 
by individuals. When we want to understand why an individual acts in a certain way, we don’t 
look in the brain in order to know what his or her intentions are but we derive them from the 
actions and the situation in which the individual acts. Knowing what a person does is “attrib-
uting intentional states” to her. We ask “What are the constitutive features of our practice that 
account for its explanatory power? That is, what assumptions do we need to make about an 
agent in order to interpret her behavior successfully? If interpretation is successful, then the 
assumptions we make about an agent in the process of interpreting her are justified.” In order 
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to know why someone acts, we don’t examine a person’s brain states, so the body, but we 
consider the person that has been constituted by this body and see whether we can ascribe rel-
evant intentions to this person. 
Following Dennett, this approach can also be applied to groups, so Tollefsen. Dennett devel-
oped the “intentional stance”. “When we adopt the intentional stance toward an entity, we at-
tempt to explain and predict its behavior by treating it as if it were a rational agent whose ac-
tions are governed by its beliefs, intentions, and desires”, so Tollefsen, interpreting Dennett. 
But if this is correct, then we can apply the intentional stance also to groups. Groups are con-
stituted by the individuals that make up a group. Moreover, when we ascribe an intention to 
an agent, we don’t look for the way it is formed in his or her brain, as said, but we ascribe the 
intention to the person as a whole. In the same way, even though a group hasn’t a kind of 
brain (and mind) as an equivalent to a person’s brain (or mind), nonetheless we can ascribe 
intentions to a group and treat it as if it has. We simply must consider the group as an entity 
formed by its members and treat it as a whole, and consider this entity as a rationally acting 
agent, so Tollefsen. By doing so, we can ascribe intentions and actions to groups. (Tollefsen 
2015, pp. 97-99) 
 
2. The constitution view 
2.1 Before I’ll assess Tollefsen’s approach to the problem of collective intentionality, let me 
first go back to the two Claims and the four main approaches presented above. In essence the 
problem of collective intentionality is the question what it involves: What does it mean for us 
to intend as a group or in general as a collective unity? But if the answers to this question are 
founded on the Irreducibility Claim and on the Individual Ownership Claim then basically the 
problem is insoluble, since the claims are contradictory, as also Schweikard and Schmid say. 
The Irreducibility Claim says that collective intentionality is a collective (for instance group) 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to individual intentionality (or actually to what kind of 
individual phenomenon ever). The Individual Ownership Claim says, however, that collective 
intentionality is a kind of individual intentionality. Bratman’s content approach, Tuomela’s 
mode approach and Gilbert’s subject approach consider that collective intentionality can be 
derived from what individuals intend and then do, but this doesn’t yet make collective inten-
tionality a phenomenon of its own, as the Irreducibility Claim states. Searle’s approach, on 
the other hand, considers collective intentionality as a phenomenon of its own, but he doesn’t 
make clear how a mode-switch to collective intentionality relates to what individuals do. So 
in order to get a grip on the problem of collective intentionality we must either delete one of 
the claims, and then the Irreducibility Claim is the first choice, or we must show how the 
claims can be reconciled with each other. Since I think that collective intentionality is a phe-
nomenon of its own, indeed, and that it is not a simple summation, aggregate, or distributive 
pattern of individual intentionality, in this essay I’ll make a proposal how both claims can be 
reconciled. 
One option to deal with the incompatibility of the claims is Tollefsen’s approach to the prob-
lem of collective intentionality. Actually, Tollefsen simply avoids the question whether col-
lective intentionality is a phenomenon of its own or whether it can be reduced in some way to 
individual actions. In my words, I would formulate Tollefsen’s approach this way: In order to 
solve the methodological question how to investigate collective intentionality we don’t need 
to solve the metaphysical question what kind of phenomenon collective intentionality is. 
As I have made clear in my 1996 (chapter V), methodological questions are on a different 
level than metaphysical questions. They cannot be used to solve metaphysical questions. 
However, for solving methodological questions it is enough to ascribe certain characteristics 
to the phenomenon one wants to investigate, and as long as this ascription is reasonable and 
as long as it works, it’s okay, at least for a start if one doesn’t know yet enough about the 
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characteristics of the phenomenon one wants to study, and afterwards, the justification of the 
ascription is in the result. As Tollefsen says (see above): “If interpretation is successful, then 
the assumptions we make about an agent in the process of interpreting her are justified.” 
On these grounds Tollefsen can ascribe collective intentionality to groups, without assuming 
that groups are actually acting subjects. And that’s what she does in her approach. Ascribing 
collective intentionality to groups is for her a stance in Dennett’s sense. In this way she 
doesn’t need to solve the metaphysical question what collective intentions fundamentally are 
and she avoids the incompatibility of the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership 
Claim, while at the same time she can successfully make sense of the idea of collective inten-
tionality and so investigate problems in this field. 
In this way, the question whether to see the collectiveness of collective intentionality in the 
content, in the mode or in the subject of the intention becomes irrelevant in Tollefsen’s ap-
proach. This question makes only sense if the collective object of study is seen as made up of 
individuals. Then one has to deal with the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership 
Claim and one has to reconcile these claims. But by simply assuming that a collectivity is a 
subject of its own with its own characteristics, basically independent of the characteristics of 
the individuals that make up the group, Tollefsen circumvents these claims and so she circum-
vents the need to reconcile them. 
As for the latter, I think that this is one of the main advantages of Tollefsen’s approach: 
avoiding the conflict between the two irreconcilable claims that seem to be fundamental to the 
collective intentionality problem. In this sense it’s a step forward compared with the different 
types of approaches discussed here before. Nevertheless. I think that we can get a step further 
by not just assuming that a collectivity is a subject of its own but by showing that it is. By do-
ing so we give Tollefsen’s interpretivism an objective foundation. Then we avoid the incom-
patibility of both claims and at the same time solve the metaphysical question what kind of 
phenomenon collective intentionality is and treat it as a subject of its own with characteristics 
independent of the individuals that make up the collectivity. To my mind, the ground that a 
group is really a phenomenon of its own and no simple summation, aggregate, or distributive 
pattern of individuals is provided by the so-called constitution view. There are several ver-
sions of the constitution view. In order to illustrate my point, I’ll use the version developed by 
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Baker used the constitution view in order to solve the question 
what the relationship is between my being a person and my being a body. However, we can 
also use it for answering the question what the relation is between a group and its members 
and for demonstrating that groups (and generally collectivities as well) are subjects of their 
own. 
 
2.2 I’ll first explain how according to Baker a human person is constituted by the human 
body, although the person is not identical to the body that constitutes her. Then I’ll show how 
we can apply this approach to our problem. Baker uses the constitution view for making clear 
what makes a human person different from her body, and for this, so Baker, we must know 
both what makes a person as a person different from the body she is and what makes a person 
a human person. In the present context in which we want to know what makes a group differ-
ent from its members only Baker’s answer to the first question is relevant. 
To answer this question, let’s look at Michelangelo’s famous statue of David. Actually, it is 
not more than a piece of marble, which Baker calls Piece. (Baker 2000, ch.2) Moreover, this 
piece of marble is not simply a lump of stone but it is also a work of art, representing the Jew-
ish King David. However, so Baker, Piece and David are not identical. In a world without art, 
for instance in a dog world, Piece would exist as a piece of marble but not as David. In such a 
world Piece would exist but David wouldn’t. On the other hand, David cannot exist without 
Piece. If Michelangelo would have died after he had bought Piece but before he had made 
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David, Piece would have existed but David hadn’t. But once David exists, he has properties 
that Piece has not. David, so Baker, “could not exist without being a statue. So, David has a 
property ... that Piece lacks” (2000, 30). And David has a head and arms, which Piece hasn’t. 
It’s David (the person we see in the marble) not Piece that represents the Jewish king. And it’s 
not David that has the property “stony” but Piece has. So David and Piece are not identical, 
but because David cannot exist without Piece (while Piece can exist without David), we say 
that Piece constitutes David, so Baker. In the same way we must think the relationship be-
tween my body and me as a person. I as a person cannot exist without my body, but my body 
and I are not identical: My body constitutes the person I am. As a person I have properties 
which my body hasn’t. As a person I can be a father, a philosopher, I can hope that something 
happens, I can help others, and so on, which are properties which my body cannot have. On 
the other hand, my body can have properties which we usually don’t ascribe to the person. If 
we say that “she is a dark-skinned person” we mean a person with a dark skin, in the sense 
that her body has a dark skin, although this can have consequences for the person she is, of 
course. In the same way the body can break a leg, although the person cannot, even if it has 
serious consequences for the person she is. The body can have one kidney and this need not to 
have any consequence for the person she is (she can even have been born with one kidney and 
never know it). So a person and her body are different things. However, obviously, there is a 
relationship, for a person cannot exist without her body. 
After having described with words what constitution is, Baker elaborates a quite technical 
definition of constitution in logical terms. In order to avoid here a detailed and complicated 
exposition, I want to summarize her idea of constitution in this way (see Baker 2000, 39-44): 
y is constituted by x at time t (or during a certain period T) if  
a) x and y exist at the same time t. 
b) x and y are spatially coincident at t. 
c) y is constituted by x in virtue of certain circumstances C. For example, David exists be-
cause Michelangelo carved David from Piece. A piece of paper constitutes a marriage license 
in virtue of certain legal conventions. It is in virtue of its evolutionary history that a particular 
conglomerate of cells constitutes a human heart. 
d) The relevant background circumstances B are present. So David is only a work of art, if 
there is an art world. Three persons are not an advisory committee of a government, when 
they happen to play in a football team against a team that consists of several cabinet ministers 
and other players. 
e) If B and C are present, it’s necessary that y is constituted by x. 
f) It is possible that x exists at t while y doesn’t exist at t. 
g) If y is immaterial, then x is also immaterial. 
Although Baker is more detailed in her explanation of what constitution is, I think that this is 
enough for understanding what constitution is about. 
What does this mean for the idea of collective intentionality? This becomes clear if we apply 
Baker’s idea of constitution to collectivities. When applying a-g here by way of illustration, I 
think of groups, so of not too big collectivities, in the first place, but basically we can see any 
collectivity as constituted by its members (which I’ll not further discuss here). Then, if we 
take a group, say a committee, a sports team, a group of workers constructing a road by order 
of their employer, etc., such a group is made up of several individuals who constitute the 
group in the sense just indicated, for: 
a) and b) The group members make up the group during a certain time. For example, the team 
exists during the match and some short time before and after; the group of road workers con-
sists during the working hours. 
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c) There is a rule that says who belongs to the group. For example, the coach determines who 
belongs to the team. The law says who belongs to the advisory committee of the government. 
The employer has hired the road workers. 
d) The team belongs to a club, the club is a member of the national football association, sport 
belongs to the culture of the country. Or for the government committee: There is a state, there 
are laws, there is a government, a parliament, etc. 
e) If the players accept the rules of the club and the league and the other way round, as a con-
sequence they are an official team that can take part in the league’s competition. 
f) It’s not necessary that John or Marie play in the team. They could have decided to choose 
other hobbies. The road construction workers could have chosen other jobs (as individuals). A 
person asked for the government committee can decline the appointment. 
g) Not relevant here. 
Once a group has been established, it becomes an entity of its own that has characteristics in-
dependent of the individual characteristics of the group members put together. One conse-
quence is that it is not necessary that a group consists of the same individual members during 
its existence. New members can be added (if the group rules allow) and old members can 
leave and nevertheless it remains the same group. On the other hand it is possible that exactly 
the same individuals constitute different groups that are independent of each other. So John, 
Pete, Anna and Marie can make up a government advisory team and at the same time be 
members of an athletics club and form there a mixed 4x400 meters relay team that keeps its 
activities strictly separated from what the government advisory committee does. 
 
3. Groups as entities of their own 
As said, a group can have characteristics independent of the individual characteristics of the 
group members put together. A trivial example is that a group can be big or small, but this 
doesn’t mean that its members are big or small. Many groups have a kind of structure with 
positions and roles held by the members, but this doesn’t say anything about the members it-
self. A certain member can hold a certain position in a group, like being the secretary, but 
then she holds a position, and it isn’t so that she is the position. The position remains when 
this member gives up her task as secretary and leaves the group, or when she just becomes its 
president. I think this point is clear and doesn’t need further explanation. More interesting are 
cases like that someone can be a member of a group without agreeing with the goals of the 
group, or that a group can take a decision that is against the view of the majority of its mem-
bers. An example of the former is the case of someone who joins a group because it is good 
for his career, or because she likes or loves a member of the group, or just because she needs 
company, etc., but in fact doesn’t care about the goal of the group or even hates it. These 
things happen, more often than you may think. However, the case that a group can take a de-
cision that is against the view of the majority of its members goes to the heart of the problem I 
am discussing in this essay, and therefore I want to give it a bit more attention.  
Take this case, discussed by List and Pettit (2013, pp. 45-46).  They call it the “discursive di-
lemma”: “[I]magine an expert panel that has to give advice on global warning. … The panel 
seeks to form judgments on the following propositions (and their negations): 
- Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels are above 6500 million metric tons of car-
bon per annum (proposition ‘p’). 
- If global carbon dioxide emissions are above this threshold, then the global temperature will 
increase by at least 1.5 degrees Celsius over the next three decades (proposition ‘if p then q’). 
- The global temperature will increase by at least 1.5 degrees Celsius over the next three dec-
ades (proposition ‘q’). 
The three propositions are complex factual propositions on which the experts may reasonably 




Table 1. A discursive dilemma 
  Emissions above If p then temper- Temperature 
  threshold?  ature increase?  increase?  
  (p?)   (if p then q?)  (q?) 
 
Individual 1   True   True    True 
 
Individual 2   True   False    False 
 
Individual 3   False   True    False 
 
Majority   True   True    False 
 
Given the judgments in Table 1, a majority of experts judges that emissions are above the rel-
evant threshold (‘p’), a majority judges that, if they are above this threshold, then the tempera-
ture will increase by 1.5 degrees Celsius (‘if p then q’), and yet a majority judges that there 
will be no temperature increase (not ‘q’).” (List and Pettit, 2013, pp. 45-46; the table has been 
slightly adapted) List and Pettit conclude then that “a majority voting on interconnected prop-
ositions may lead to inconsistent group judgments even when individual judgments are fully 
consistent …” (p. 46). Although this is true, in my context I want to give the example a wider 
interpretation. To my mind the case shows that what groups do and what individuals do are 
different things and are on a different level. Groups are not simple aggregates of individuals. 
That’s what we see when we explicitly ask group members to vote on what to do. I’ll make 
this clear with an example that I have adapted from a blog that I have written a few years ago 
on this issue. 
Tom, Dick and Harry take a walk together through the countryside and have to cross a pasture 
with cows. Then Tom says: “I think that we can better walk round the pasture for I see a bull 
over there.” Dick agrees, but then he says: “I cannot see it well, but I think that the bull is tied 
to a pole, so let’s cross the pasture. I am tired and want to be home as soon as possible.” “You 
are wrong”, Tom replies, “and even if the bull is tied up, I don’t want to take the risk. What 
do you think, Harry?” Harry, a farmer, says: “As far as I can see, the bull runs free, but if we 
keep our distance, we don’t need to be afraid. Maybe the bull will look at us, but he will keep 
away. So, let’s take the shortest path and cross the pasture.” However, since Tom, Dick and 
Harry don’t come to an agreement what to do, they decide to vote on the issue. You find the 
views of the walkers and what they want to do in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. A group dilemma 
  afraid of bulls   bull is tied wants to walk 
  wants to avoid the bull to a pole through the pasture 
   (1)   (2)  (3) 
Tom    yes    no   no 
 
Dick    yes    yes   yes 
 
Harry    no    no   yes 
 




As we see in Table 2, a majority wants to avoid the bull, because they are afraid of bulls (col-
umn 1). Moreover, a different majority thinks that the bull is not tied to a pole, which means 
that it is not safe to cross the pasture. Therefore, one would expect that the group decides to 
walk round the pasture. Nevertheless, a majority decides to cross the pasture, just because 
Harry, being a farmer, thinks that they can avoid the bull even when they cross the pasture. 
The cases just discussed are instances of a general case, made famous by Lewis A. Korn-
hauser and Lawrence G. Sager (1993). In order to be complete and because it gives a little dif-
ferent view of the problem under discussion (see List and Pettit, 2013, pp. 43-47), I’ll de-
scribe also this case. For practical reason, I’ll follow the description by List and Pettit (2013, 
p. 44): 
“Suppose a three-member court has to make a decision in a breach-of-contract case. The court 
seeks to make judgments on the following propositions: 
- The defendant was contractually obliged not to do a certain action (the first premise). 
- The defendant did that action (the second premise). 
- The defendant is liable for breach of contraction (the conclusion). 
According to legal doctrine, obligation and action are jointly necessary and sufficient for lia-
bility; that is, the conclusion is true if and only if both premises are true. Suppose, as shown in 
Table 3, judge 1 believes both premises to be true; judge 2 believes the first but not the sec-
ond premise to be true; and judge three believes the second but not the first to be true. Then 
each premise is accepted by majority of judges, yet only a minority, that is, judge 1, individu-
ally considers the defendant liable.”  
 
Table 3. A verdict 
  Obligation?  Action?   Liable?  
 
Judge 1  True    True    True 
 
Judge 2  True    False    False 
 
Judge 3  False    True    False 
 
Majority  True    True    False 
 
(From List and Pettit (2013), p. 44) 
 
So far List and Pettit, following Kornhauser and Sager. In Table 3 the defendant is considered 
not liable. This is so, because the general conclusion is made up by adding the individual con-
clusion of the judges (1x “True” against 2x “False”). However, if the judges vote first on the 
separate premises and then use the results of these votes for their conclusion, they’ll judge 
that the defendant is guilty (see third row: Obligation=True + Action=True, which makes Lia-
ble=True). 
 
4. Groups are constituted by their members 
I have yet described a somewhat difference case in my blog “Government dilemmas” (2015), 
but let’s go on and ask what these examples bring to us. To my mind, what these cases exem-
plify is not only that what a group does and what the individuals who make up the group do 
are basically different things. A group is an entity of its own. A group is constituted by its 
members, as we have seen, and by this and because of this it has characteristics, which are not 
a simple summation, aggregate, or distributive pattern of the characteristics of the members 
that constitute the group (see the Irreducibility Claim). A group and its members are on 
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different levels. Each level has its own characteristics and in a way each level can act inde-
pendently of what the other level does. I want to explain how this can happen with a very dif-
ferent example, namely the current of a river. A river is an element in a landscape consisting 
of a bed filled with water that streams through the bed: the stream or current. The current as 
such consists of individual water molecules that on the average move into one direction. How-
ever, it doesn’t need to be so that all molecules at each moment move into the main direction. 
Individual molecules can even move into the opposite direction, for example because they are 
in a whirl. But on the average the molecules follow the direction of the main stream (that’s 
just why this stream exists). If we now want to explain why the river streams this way or that 
way, why it meanders in this direction or another direction, why the rivers streams fast or 
slowly, or whatever a river scientist wants to know about how a river streams, he doesn’t 
study the behaviour or the separate water molecules that constitute the river, but he takes the 
stream of the river as an entity of its own with its own characteristics. It’s not the water mole-
cules that stream but the current that does, and there is a difference between the behaviour 
(movements) of the water molecules that make up the current and the current itself. Attrac-
tion, bumping etc. are activities ascribed to molecules and not to currents and altogether this 
makes that a river streams, but in no way, anyhow, the streaming of the river can be ascribed 
to the individual molecules, which can move in opposite directions, as said. On the other 
hand, drop, speed, discharge, etc. are ascribed to river currents. So we must distinguish the 
level of the river current, which is studied by river scientists, and the level of the water mole-
cules, which is studied by physicists and chemists. In the same way, we can distinguish the 
group (upper level) from the individuals that constitute the group (lower level). Once we un-
derstand this, we can see that the individuals that constitute a group can have their own inten-
tions and other ideas of how the group should function and what the group must do, but that 
nevertheless the group, which is constituted by the individual intentions of its member, can 
have an intentionality of its own. Seen this way, the Irreducibility Claim and Individual Own-
ership Claim are no longer contradictory for they refer to different levels. The Irreducibility 
Claim applies to the upper level (group level), while the Individual Ownership Claim applies 
to the lower level (level of the individual group members). But as we see have seen, the group 
level is not independent from the lower level of the group members, but it is constituted by it. 
This makes, for instance, that the group intentions, desires, etc. on the upper level are consti-
tuted by what the group members on the lower level intend, desire, etc. In this way, for exam-
ple, in the case of the judges, the court’s decision is or can be different from what the majority 
of the individual judges decide, but the court’s decision cannot exist independently from the 
individual decisions of the judges that make up the group. 
Groups are constituted by their members, and likewise group intentionality is constituted by 
the intentions of the members that constitute the group. Above we have seen that for Tollefsen 
ascribing intentionality to a group actually is a matter of taking a methodological stance to-
wards a group in Dennett’s sense. It’s a way to interpret what a group does and a means for 
explaining its actions without reducing the group actions to the individual actions of its mem-
bers. However, by showing that a group is constituted by its members in Baker’s sense, I have 
made clear that ascribing intentionality to a group is not merely a stance but that it has a meta-
physical foundation. So, Tollefsen’s approach is based on what really is the case. In the sense 
just explained groups exist. They are real, for they are the consequence of purposeful, inten-
tional individual actions. How else could it be? If groups weren’t real social phenomena, we 
couldn’t explain, for instance, how a sports team can become champion, if the members that 
make up the team at the beginning of the season are not the same members that make up the 
team at the end of the season (or for a part). For each time a team member would have been 
replaced by a new member, we would have a different team. But just as we don’t get a new 
car, when its tyres are replaced, we don’t get a new team if a member is replaced. A car is 
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constituted by its parts and so is the team. That a team becomes champion is the consequence 
of purposeful and intentional actions by the team members but as such these individual ac-
tions aren’t group actions. A team can play a match because its actions are constituted by the 
individual actions of its players, but these don’t need to be the same players all the time. 
 
5. How other views on collective intentionality fit into my approach 
We have seen so far that collective intentions are constituted by what the individual agents 
who constitute the collectivity concerned intend. This seems to suggest that I reject the ap-
proaches by Bratman, Gilbert, Searle and Tuomela discussed above. However, although a col-
lective intention is constituted by individual intentions, the fact remains that we must fill in 
the idea of collective intentionality in a certain way and for this we need approaches like those 
developed by Bratman, Gilbert, Searle or Tuomela, or which other approach you prefer. 
Above, I summarized Searle’s approach in this way: “Group intentions are ideas that exist in 
the minds of the individual agents, but they are performed by means of what the agents indi-
vidually do.” In a sense it’s also what Bratman, Gilbert and Tuomela maintain, each in his or 
her own way. We can link this with my constitution approach in this way: Although collective 
intentionality exists on a higher level – say level 1 – there is a basic level – level 0 – that con-
stitutes the higher level. Just as David, the statue, does not exist without Piece, the marble, 
collective intentionality does not exist without the group-oriented intentions of the individual 
agents. It’s here that the approaches developed by Bratman, Gilbert and Tuomela, but also the 
one developed by Searle, come into play. They can be seen as approaches at level 0. 
However, as it happens, usually it is assumed – at least implicitly – that there is only one way 
to fill in the idea of collective intentionality and that the question is to find out what it is like. 
But why should there be only one type of collective intention? Why cannot there exist differ-
ent kinds of collective intentionality next to each other at the same time? Groups are struc-
tured in many ways. Some groups are loosely structured entities that hardly can be called 
groups, like a few passers-by who cooperate in order to rescue a person from drowning. Other 
groups, are organised for a longer time in order to execute a task. Again other groups have a 
permanent, maybe hierarchical structure and when a member leaves he or she is replaced by 
someone else. Some groups have an open membership, other ones have a fixed number of 
members. And so on. I don’t need to explain. If so, why wouldn’t it be possible that there are 
different types of collective relations characterised by different kinds of collective intentional-
ity for different types of cooperation? So, Bratman’s idea of shared intention describes better 
a kind of relatively loose cooperation between people, while Gilbert’s joint commitment, and 
maybe more so collective intention in Searle’s sense, fits more structured kinds of cooperation 
better. Seen this way it’s not the question which approach of collective intentionality is the 
right one, be it the one proposed by Bratman, Gilbert, Tuomela or Searle, or who else has 
come with an idea what it is like. In some cases collective behaviour can best be explained by 
Bratman’s approach, in other cases Gilbert’s approach is better and in again other cases 
Searle’s answer is best or a type of collective intention developed by Tuomela. Seen this way 
the question is which type of collective intentionality fits the situation to be described or ex-
plained best. My view is that collective intentionality can have different expressions and can 
take different shapes. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Schweikard and Schmid (2020) state that the debate on collective intentionality is character-
ized by the presence of two contradictory claims, the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual 
Ownership Claim, and that the problem is how to bring these claims into line with each other. 
In this essay I have shown how these claims can be reconciled, namely with the help of the 
constitution theory as developed by Lynne Rudder Baker. However, if the relationship 
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between group and members is a matter of constitution, actually then the possibility of collec-
tive intentionality is not exceptional at all, but it is an instance of a general phenomenon. In 
fact, constitution is something perfectly normal. Statues are constituted by the material they 
are made of (of course, under certain conditions like those I have discussed above); in a natu-
ral way rivers are constituted by water molecules; and so on. And in the same way groups are 
constituted by its members. By this process of constitution, what is “higher”, on level 1, gets 
other properties and characteristics than what is “lower”, on level 0. Once this has become 
clear, we can move our attention from the problem how to reconcile the Irreducibility Claim 
and the Individual Ownership Claim to the problem what kinds of collective intentionality 
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